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NOTES 
AMAZON, OR THE MODERN PROMETHEUS: 
HOW THE KINDLE IS FIRING UP A READING REVOLUTION, 
AND WHY THE STATUS QUO IS RESISTING 
Stanley Joseph Konoval* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It has been estimated that Amazon had, in recent history, 90% of the 
e-book market cornered (though more recent estimates put Amazon’s 
e-book market share at approximately 60%).1 In other words, Amazon is 
making a killing. However, killings do not happen without victims.2 For 
                                                                                                                           
 
* B.A., Colgate University; M.A., San Francisco State University; J.D. Candidate, 2015, 
University of Pittsburgh. The author would like to thank Professor Peter Oh for his comments, 
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1 Andrew Albanese, Judge Approves Final E-book Settlements, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY, Dec. 6, 
2013, available at http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/digital/content-and-e-books/article/ 
60282-judge-approves-final-e-book-settlements-payments-to-begin-in-early-2014.html. 
2 For a particularly acerbic—and not unbiased—take on Amazon’s business practices, see 
Kathleen Sharp, Amazon’s Bogus Anti-Apple Crusade, SALON (Jan. 12, 2014), available at http://www 
.salon.com/2014/01/12/amazons_bogus_anti_apple_crusade/ (“You may remember that Amazon helped 
persuade the U.S. [DOJ] to sue Apple . . . claiming that Apple conspired with . . . publishers to fix the 
price of e-books . . . . Amazon, the web’s biggest retailer, had been selling published books at a money-
losing rate of $9.99. Why? To get us to buy its Kindle e-book reader, and to dominate the e-book 
market. . . . This meant that publishers—who had invested in the writing, production, promotion and 
distribution of these books—couldn’t sell their wares at the recommended retail price of $14.99. Nor 
could brick-and-mortar stores match Amazon’s money-losing discounts.”). 
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example, Barnes and Noble (“B&N”) recently reported a 60% drop in its 
digital division.3 According to a Bloomberg Businessweek contributor, 
[e]-book prices are a big reason why Barnes & Noble is losing this battle . . . 
Amazon often sells e-books at a loss, using low prices to lure customers into the 
Kindle ecosystem. It goes so far as to give many books away [by allowing its 
Amazon Prime members to borrow e-books for free]. . . .”4 
As Businessweek—and B&N’s revenue—attest to, “Barnes & Noble 
doesn’t have the resources or the relationship with customers to match 
MatchBook and services like it.”5 
Amazon has not only put a sizeable dent in B&N’s business; it has 
been hurting book publishers, as well, and the publishers have tried fighting 
back: 
According [to an antitrust complaint filed by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
against Apple and five New York book publishers], the five publishers and 
Apple were unhappy that competition among e-book sellers had reduced e-book 
prices and . . . retail profit margins. . . . To address these concerns . . . the 
companies worked together to enter into contracts that eliminated price 
competition among bookstores selling e-books, substantially increasing prices 
paid by consumers.6 
On April 11, 2012, the DOJ and thirty-three U.S. states and territories 
filed suit against Apple and five of the six largest book publishers in 
America for colluding with each other to raise prices on e-books in direct 
response to what the publishers perceived as Amazon’s undervaluing of 
e-books by pricing them at $9.99.7 All five publishers settled.8 Apple went 
to trial and lost, in the Southern District of New York, in July 2013.9 The 
                                                                                                                           
 
3 Brad Stone, Barnes & Noble’s Nook Nightmare Stars Amazon and the DOJ, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-09/barnes-and-nobles-
nook-sales-hurt-by-amazons-lower-e-book-prices. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. (MatchBook is a program recently unveiled by Amazon whereby publishers may elect to 
sale e-books to consumers for a reduced price (maximum of $2.99) when the consumer has made an 
eligible purchase of a hard copy of that same title). 
6 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Penguin Group 
(USA) Inc. in E-Books Case (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2012/ 
290409.pdf. 
7 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 645–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
8 Id. at 645. 
9 Id. 
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court found that all of the parties conspired to “raise, fix, and stabilize the 
retail price” of e-books in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.10 
Yet, while litigation was ongoing, Random House, the largest 
publisher in America, and Penguin agreed to merge (announced on 
October 29, 2012),11 received approval from the DOJ (February 14, 2013),12 
and completed the merger (July 1, 2013).13 Though Random House was not 
a party to the DOJ’s antitrust suit, it had, in only a matter of months after 
the illegal agreements were forged, signed essentially the same contract 
with Apple that the other publishers had signed.14  
While Penguin’s settlement agreement, the terms of which will be 
discussed below, will be binding upon the newly created company 
(“Penguin Random House”),15 the DOJ’s approval of the merger—with no 
conditions other than those imposed by Penguin’s settlement agreement—
occurred while the DOJ continued litigation against Apple. This seems to 
indicate some cognitive dissonance on the DOJ’s part. While the publishers 
settled without admitting guilt, the DOJ, in arguing for its case against 
Apple, necessarily had to show that Apple colluded with the publishers to 
raise prices. In other words, at the same time the DOJ was considering and 
ultimately approving the Penguin-Random House merger, it was also 
arguing in court that Apple and Penguin (and other publishers) had 
conspired to engage in anti-competitive behavior. There seems to be 
something counterintuitive about the DOJ allowing a company to complete 
a merger while at the same time arguing that that company had recently 
engaged in anti-competitive behavior. 
Why might the DOJ have approved the merger while continuing to 
litigate? The DOJ must have believed that the merger would not result in 
                                                                                                                           
 
10 Id. 
11 Random House, Penguin Agree to Merge, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (Oct. 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/industry-deals/article/54536-random-
house-penguin-agree-to-merge.html. 
12 DOJ Clears Random House, Penguin Merger, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (Feb. 14, 2013), available 
at http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/industry-deals/article/55961-doj-
clears-random-house-penguin-merger.html. 
13 Random House, Penguin Merger Completed, PUBLISHERS WEEKLY (July 1, 2013), available at 
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/industry-deals/article/58047-random-
house-penguin-merger-completed.html. 
14 Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 686. 
15 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 6. 
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anti-competitive effects. As will be discussed below, publishing is an 
industry which is undergoing radical change. This is due, in part, to 
advances in technology and to Amazon’s trailblazing practices. 
Furthermore, publishers have already shown that they are more inclined to 
try strong-arm tactics to maintain the status-quo rather than innovate—
which explains the DOJ’s antitrust suit against Apple and the New York 
publishers. So, the questions we need to answer are: why exactly did the 
DOJ so quickly approve of the merger during this related litigation, and will 
the approval of the Penguin-Random House merger undermine the ability 
of Penguin’s prior settlement to promote or protect consumer welfare? 
Part II of this paper will elucidate the Southern District of New York’s 
opinion in which Judge Cote found Apple guilty of anti-competitive 
behavior; the decision chronicles nicely the anxiety traditional New York 
book publishers have been feeling for years because of Amazon’s ultra-
competitive low-pricing and ground-breaking new programs (as 
exemplified by the new MatchBook program described above).16 This 
elucidation of the New York publishers’ anxiety and desperation, which 
manifested in the publishers’ anti-competitive behavior, heightens the 
counterintuitive nature of the DOJ’s approval of the Penguin-Random 
House merger. Part III will lay out some of the DOJ’s criteria for evaluating 
mergers, as outlined in its latest Horizontal Merger Guidelines—there, I 
will also briefly discuss the antitrust policies of the Obama administration 
as explained by members of the administration. In Part IV, I will provide an 
analysis of the merger, using the Guidelines, which will go a long way 
toward explaining why the DOJ had few concerns about the competitive 
effects of the merger. This will resolve the apparent mystery of why the 
DOJ approved the merger with the Apple litigation ongoing. I will also 
briefly explain why, not just from the DOJ analysis, but from lay and 
industry perspectives as well, the Penguin-Random House merger seemed 
like it would benefit consumers—and why it may actually have the opposite 
effect. This uncertainty in possible outcomes suggests that the DOJ erred in 
providing the public no insight into its decision-making process. Greater 
transparency would have laid to rest not only the question of what effects 
this merger is expected to have on the industry; it also would have assured 
                                                                                                                           
 
16 See supra note 5 for details regarding Amazon’s MatchBook program. 
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the public that the DOJ actually had thoroughly considered the nuances in a 
rapidly changing industry in evaluating likelihood of any unintended 
consequences. 
II. GETTING A LAY OF THE LAND (I.E., MAPPING OUT THE DIRE STRAITS 
NEW YORK PUBLISHERS HAVE FOUND THEMSELVES IN) 
Hachette Book Group, Inc., HarperCollins Publishers LLC, 
Holtzbrinck Publishers LLC (“Macmillan”), Penguin Group (USA), Inc., 
Simon & Schuster, Inc., and Random House are known as publishing’s 
“Big Six.”17 The Big Six wanted to raise e-book prices for its New York 
Times Bestsellers above Amazon’s standard $9.99.18 Fortuitously for the 
publishers, Apple was planning on launching its first iPad, and it was 
hoping to have its iBookstore established in time for the launch.19 Five of 
the Big Six (i.e., all of the publishers except for Random House)—referred 
to below as the “Big Five” and “Publisher Defendants” alternatively—met 
with Apple and realized they shared a goal: “[T]hat there be no price 
competition at the retail level. Apple did not want to compete with Amazon 
. . . on price; and the Publisher Defendants wanted to end Amazon’s $9.99 
pricing and increase significantly the prevailing price point for e-books.”20 
There are two models by which the publishers can set prices for books: 
the wholesale model and the agency model. The wholesale model functions 
in that the publisher receives a designated “wholesale” price for each unit 
and the retailer, in this case Amazon, sets the retail price.21 The agency 
model is where “the publisher sets the retail price and the retailer sells the 
e-book as [the publisher’s] agent.”22 Because the publishers had been 
operating under the wholesale model, Amazon was able to sell the books 
for whatever price it wanted, thus the $9.99 price point for many books. 
The Big Six “feared [Amazon’s pricing] would have a number of 
pernicious effects on their profits . . . [they] believed the low price point 
was eating into sales of their . . . hardcover books . . . and threatening the 
                                                                                                                           
 
17 Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 645, 647. 
18 Id. at 647. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 648. 
22 Id. 
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viability of the brick-and-mortar stores in which hardcover books were 
displayed and sold.”23 The Big Six also feared that consumers would come 
to expect books to fall into the $9.99 price range, thus entrenching the price 
for the future.24 
Apple was offering the Big Six the opportunity to move from a 
wholesale model to an agency model. But there was a catch: the Big Six’s 
contract with Apple would not only guarantee Apple that it could match the 
lowest retail price of any of its competitors, it also would “impose[] a 
severe financial penalty upon the Publisher Defendants if they did not force 
Amazon . . . to change [its] business model[] and cede control over e-book 
pricing to the Publishers.”25 Apple made it clear that this was a watershed 
moment for the publishers.26 
To put this in perspective: in 2009, Amazon was estimated to have 
90% of the e-book market cornered.27 Judge Cote provided an illustrative 
and concise summary of the Big Six’s response to Amazon’s dominance: 
Penguin told Amazon that “their $9.99 model” was “not a good sustainable 
one.”. . . [Simon and Schuster] bluntly told Amazon that the $9.99 price point 
was “a mistake” and that [they] would “continue to be vocal because . . . it’s 
terrible for business.”. . . In . . . December 2009, Hachette [told Amazon] that 
Amazon’s $9.99 pricing posed a “big problem” for the industry [and that 
Amazon should raise e-book prices by one or two dollars].28 
The publishers had tried various methods to combat Amazon which proved 
fruitless (e.g., “windowing” whereby the publishers would release 
hardcovers before e-books in order to stimulate sales of the hardcovers).29 
However, it became clear to the Publisher Defendants that they needed to 
take Apple’s offer. 
Amazon was aware that the publishers were going to push for a change 
to an agency model; in response, Amazon created the Kindle Digital 
Platform in January 2010, which allowed Amazon to deal directly with 
authors—by allowing any and all authors to publish any new titles, or old 
                                                                                                                           
 
23 Id. at 649. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 648. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 649. 
28 Id. at 650. 
29 Id. at 651–53. 
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titles which the authors had rights to, electronically with Amazon with no 
need for a publisher or an agent; this effectively eliminated the need for a 
middleman (i.e., publishers), which further enraged the Big Six.30 The Big 
Five threatened to withhold their new release e-books from Amazon for 
seven months if Amazon would not acquiesce in changing to the agency 
model; Amazon replied by removing the publishers’ books from its 
website, which created a storm of criticism against Amazon, who 
eventually relented and signed agency model agreements with the 
publishers.31 
Each of the Big Five, when sued by the Department of Justice, settled. 
Representative of the settlements is this agreement pertaining to Penguin 
Group: 
WHEREAS . . . the United States of America filed its Complaint . . . alleging 
that Defendants conspired to raise retail prices of E-books in violation of Section 
1 of the Sherman Act . . . and Plaintiff and Penguin . . . have consented to the 
entry of this Final Judgment . . . [which] does not constitute any admission by 
Penguin that the law has been violated or of any issue of fact or law . . . are true 
. . . Penguin agrees to be bound by the provisions of this Final Judgment. . . . 
Within seven days . . . Penguin shall terminate any agreement with Apple 
relating to the Sale of E-books . . . . 
The failure of the Department of Justice to request additional information or to 
bring an action under the antitrust laws to challenge the formation . . . of [a] 
joint venture shall neither give rise to any inference of lawfulness nor limit . . . 
the right of the United States to investigate . . . activities of the joint venture. . . . 
For two years, Penguin shall not restrict, limit, or impede an E-book Retailer’s 
ability to set, alter, or reduce the Retail Price of any E-book or to offer price 
discounts or any other form of promotions . . . .32 
This is the state of things. Amazon is back in business with a diminished, 
but healthy, market share of 60% of e-book sales.33 The Big Six is now five, 
and because of their settlements with the DOJ, each of them has had to 
relinquish its profitable (if coerced) agency agreement with Amazon, 
putting them essentially back where they started—except that they are no 
                                                                                                                           
 
30 Id. at 649, 671. 
31 Id. at 679–81. 
32 United States v. Apple, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128364 at *3–4, *13, *15–16 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 17, 2013) (emphasis added). 
33 Albanese, supra note 1. 
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longer free to play hardball with Amazon for years because of the 
settlement agreements. As the excerpt from the settlement agreement above 
shows, the Publisher Defendants have no say for two years over Amazon’s 
pricing of e-books (as opposed to what had previously been the case: 
publishers had at least the possibility of playing hardball with Amazon, but 
had been afraid to do so because Amazon could retaliate). Essentially, the 
publishers are worse off now than they were before they had tried to strong-
arm Amazon. Specifically, Penguin Random House is worse off in the 
sense that it has a more limited say over pricing. However, it is better off in 
the sense that it will have the combined market share and resources of two 
of the former Big Six. 
Elucidation of the DOJ’s prompt approval of this merger raises two 
questions: (1) by what criteria did the DOJ evaluate this merger?; and 
(2) was the DOJ right to approve the merger? 
III. LAYING OUT SOME OF THE DOJ’S CRITERIA FOR 
EVALUATING MERGERS 
One simple—and cynical—explanation for the DOJ’s quick approval 
of the merger, without conditions,34 is that the DOJ just is not interested in 
aggressively pursuing antitrust cases. This explanation may be implied by 
law review articles with titles such as Antitrust Enforcement Under the 
Obama Administration: Change? Really?35 that express disappointment that 
the Obama administration is not making “dramatic changes in antitrust 
enforcement levels.”36 A quick glance at the statistics reveals that cynicism 
is probably unjustified: “Challenges to U.S. mergers and acquisitions are up 
. . . [the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)] challenged 44 deals 
during the 2012 fiscal year . . . a 19 percent jump from challenges during 
. . . 2011 . . . Steven Salop, a law professor at Georgetown university . . . 
[said] the increase . . . demonstrates the Obama administration’s greater 
emphasis on antitrust enforcement and litigation.”37 And even the 
                                                                                                                           
 
34 DOJ Clears Random House, Penguin Merger, supra note 12. 
35 Sanford M. Litvack et al., Antitrust Enforcement Under the Obama Administration: Change? 
Really?, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 227 (2011). 
36 Id. 
37 Ashley Post, Merger challenges were up in 2012 fiscal year, INSIDE COUNSEL (May 1, 2013), 
available at http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/05/01/merger-challenges-were-up-in-2012-fiscal-year. 
2014] AMAZON, OR THE MODERN PROMETHEUS 127 
 
Vol. 33, No. 1 (2014) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2014.76 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
suggestively titled law review article above concluded, “While the antitrust 
agencies under Obama plainly are intent on enforcing the antitrust laws 
more aggressively than the prior Administration, the increase has, to date, 
been modest.”38 In other words, the authors were criticizing the Obama 
Administration for not providing “major change” from the Bush 
Administration; but they would reject the proposition that the DOJ is soft 
on antitrust enforcement.39 Working under the assumption that the DOJ and 
FTC are intent on preventing anti-competitive mergers, how are they 
determining when action is or is not appropriate? 
In 2010, the DOJ and FTC released new horizontal merger guidelines 
that “outline how the federal antitrust agencies evaluate the likely 
competitive impact of mergers and whether those mergers comply with 
U.S. antitrust law.”40 (A horizontal merger is a merger between actual or 
potential competitors.41 Seeing as how the Big Six, though united in their 
opposition to Amazon, are still competitors whose products compete for 
consumers’ dollars, the merger between Penguin and Random House is a 
horizontal merger.) The “primary goal” of the new guidelines is to help 
“identify and challenge competitively harmful mergers while avoiding 
unnecessary interference with mergers that either are competitively 
beneficial or likely will have no competitive impact on the marketplace.”42 
We can do a bit of quasi a priori reasoning from just these revelations, plus 
what facts we already know. Let us begin with the facts: the DOJ approved 
the Penguin-Random House merger without conditions—and we also know 
that the Penguin settlement applies to Penguin Random House. If the basic 
policy considerations behind the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
include not just challenging harmful mergers, but also getting out of the 
way of mergers that seem beneficial, then the speed with which the DOJ got 
                                                                                                                           
 
38 Litvack et al., supra note 35, at 247. 
39 Id. at 250. 
40 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Issue 
Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 1 (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_ 
releases/2010/261642.pdf. 
41 DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES, 1 (Aug. 19, 2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010], http://www 
.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf. 
42 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 40, at 1. 
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out of the way,43 in addition to the fact that they did not impose conditions 
on the merger, suggest that the DOJ believed this merger would be 
beneficial, or at worst, have a negligible effect on the market. 
To better understand how the DOJ came to such a conclusion, we can 
start with basic, and broad, assumptions underlying the DOJ’s approach to 
mergers. According to Assistant U.S. Attorney Christine A. Varney of the 
DOJ’s Antitrust Division speaking empirically based on ten-year 
department statistics, “The vast majority of mergers are procompetitive and 
enhance consumer welfare or are competitively benign.”44 Mergers of 
course can detrimentally affect consumers, which Ms. Varney stated “can 
take many forms, including higher prices, slower innovation, lower quality, 
and reduced product variety. In some cases, a transaction’s effects may take 
the form of reduced incentives to innovate, to cut prices, or to expand 
consumer choice through product variety.”45 
The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines begin with a citation to 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act46: the Act “prohibits mergers if ‘in any line of 
commerce . . . the effect . . . may be substantially to lessen competition, or 
to tend to create a monopoly.’”47 Negative impacts on the consumers may 
occur as a result of “unilateral” or “coordinated” effects (where the former 
is due to the detrimental conduct of one firm in particular and the latter is 
due to coordinated behavior among rivals).48 Mergers, the Guidelines 
indicate, should not be allowed to entrench or enhance market power, 
meaning that the merger should not “encourage one or more firms to raise 
price, reduce output, diminish innovation, or otherwise harm customers as a 
result of diminished competitive constraints or incentives.”49 In other 
words, the Guidelines state that the agencies should be on the lookout for 
mergers that are likely to negatively impact consumers in some way, 
including, but not limited to, raised prices—“Enhanced market power can 
                                                                                                                           
 
43 Four months from announcement of the merger to approval of the merger, as we will recall, 
was during a relevant antitrust suit. See supra Part I. 
44 CHRISTINE A. VARNEY, ATT’Y GEN. ANTITRUST DIV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES 
WORKSHOPS, 1 (Sept. 22, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/250238.pdf. 
45 Id. at 2. 
46 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
47 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 41, at 1. 
48 Id. at 2. 
49 Id. 
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also be manifested in non-price terms and conditions . . . including reduced 
product quality, reduced product variety, reduced service, or diminished 
innovation [which may] coexist with price effects or arise in their 
absence.”50 
While a complete survey of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is 
beyond the scope of this note, it will be useful to outline some of the 
considerations which seem particularly relevant to this merger: (1) market 
shares and market concentration; (2) unilateral effects; (3) coordinated 
effects; and (4) efficiencies.51 
Before delving into the first criterion, market shares and market 
concentration, it is important to note a few things about “market definition,” 
which is what “helps specify the line of commerce and section of the 
country in which the competitive concern arises.”52 Interestingly enough, 
the Guidelines state that the “Agencies analysis need not start with market 
                                                                                                                           
 
50 Id. 
51 For the sake of concision and relevance, not all of the factors the Agencies might consider can 
be considered thoroughly in this note. However, I will briefly synopsize the other criteria the Agencies 
may look to, which include: Powerful buyers, entry, failure and exiting assets, mergers of competing 
buyers, and partial acquisitions. 
The Agencies define powerful buyers as those buyers who are “able to negotiate favorable terms 
with their suppliers . . . . The Agencies consider the possibility that powerful buyers may constrain the 
ability of the merging parties to raise prices.” Id. at 27. This factor will be deeply entangled with the 
issue of Amazon’s involvement in the publishing industry. See infra, Part IV for further discussion of 
the possible, but uncertain, effects this merger can have on Amazon. 
Entry concerns whether potential competitors have the ability to enter the market and “deter or 
counteract any competitive effects of concern so the merger will not substantially harm customers.” 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 41, at 28. The Agencies will attempt to determine 
whether competitors are likely to enter the market in time to have a sufficient counteracting effect on 
anti-competitive concerns. Barriers to entry for online independent publishers are low, on account of 
programs like Amazon’s KDP. There may be some debate about whether the entry barriers are low for 
physical book publishers; however, the proliferation of print-on-demand services for independent 
authors and publishers probably goes a long way toward allaying this concern. 
Failure and exiting assets pertains to mergers involving firms which are literally unable to meet 
their financial obligations and are incapable of reorganizing by filing Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and have 
been unable to “elicit reasonable alternative offers that . . . pose a less severe danger to competition than 
. . . the proposed merger.” Id. at 32. This factor is irrelevant in this case. 
Mergers of competing buyers is essentially the same “framework [under discussion, except it is 
aimed toward evaluating] whether a merger is likely to enhance market power on the buying side of the 
market.” Id. There appear to be neither controversy nor concern relevant to this factor. 
Partial acquisitions involve one firm’s “partial acquisition of a competitor.” Id. at 33. This factor 
is irrelevant in this case. 
52 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 41, at 7. 
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definition” and that analysis may indeed “suggest[] alternative and 
reasonably plausible candidate markets.”53 This implies that “market” is 
somewhat of a fluid concept. However, a basic definition will be helpful in 
laying the conceptual foundation for what is to follow. “Market” may be 
defined in various ways; for the sake of simplicity, however, a broad 
definition will suffice: “market” is the concept which encompasses the 
production, demand, and revenue resulting from the sales of specific types 
of goods, the interchangeability of such goods determining the extent of a 
firm’s power over the pricing of these goods.54 “Market” is a matter of 
definition, which means that the relevant market can be determined in 
various ways—the DOJ recognizes this: “The Agencies implement . . . 
principles of market definition flexibly when evaluating different possible 
candidate markets . . . [some market definitions] are not always intuitive 
and may not align with how industry members use the term ‘market.’”55 
Market share is defined as “The percentage of the market for a product 
that a firm supplies, usually calculated by dividing the firm’s output by the 
total market output. In antitrust law, market share is used to measure a 
firm’s market power.”56 The Horizontal Guidelines state that the agencies 
“normally calculate market shares for all firms that currently produce 
products in the relevant market, subject to the availability of data . . . [and] 
also . . . for other market participants if this can be done to reliably reflect 
their competitive significance.”57 The agencies recognize that looking at 
past market shares may be somewhat of an inaccurate predictor of future 
competitiveness (e.g., in situations in which firms are anticipated to have 
exclusive access to new technology, which would presumably increase 
those firms’ competitiveness above what past market share would 
indicate).58 Market share, as measured by revenue, is an important metric 
                                                                                                                           
 
53 Id. 
54 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1055 (9th ed. 2009) definition for “market”: “A place of 
commercial activity in which goods or services are bought and sold. . . A geographic area or 
demographic segment considered as a place of demand for particular goods or services.” And in an 
antitrust context, Black’s Law Dictionary states further that a “product market” is, “[t]he part of a 
relevant market that applies to a firm’s particular product by identifying all reasonable substitutes for the 
product and by determining whether these substitutes limit the firm’s ability to affect prices.” 
55 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 41, at 8. 
56 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1058 (9th ed. 2009), “Market share.” 
57 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 41, at 16 (emphasis added). 
58 Id. 
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because it reflects “the real-world ability of firms to surmount all of the 
obstacles necessary to offer products on terms and conditions that are 
attractive to customers.”59 
Market concentration is one way the Agencies can measure the anti-
competitive effects of a merger. Market concentration may be measured by 
calculating the “Herfindahl-Hirschman Index” (“HHI”).60 HHI is calculated 
by taking the market shares of each of the firms within the market and 
summing the square of each market share: “The HHI ranges from 10,000 
(in the case of pure monopoly) to a number approaching zero (in the case of 
an atomistic market).”61 The Agencies look not only to the post-merger 
HHI, but the change in HHI from pre- to post-merger. The Agencies 
employ the following categories of markets: Unconcentrated Markets: HHI 
below 1500; Moderately Concentrated Markets: HHI between 1500 and 
2500; and Highly Concentrated Markets: HHI above 2500.62 As the DOJ 
states: “The higher the post-merger HHI and the increase in the HHI, the 
greater are the Agencies’ potential competitive concerns. . . .”63 
Unilateral effects are effects wrought upon the market directly by the 
newly merged firm. A merged firm may be capable of various flavors of 
anticompetitive behavior: a merged firm may be able to “diminish 
competition by enabling the merged firm to profit by unilaterally raising the 
price of . . . products above the pre-merger level.”64 Another important 
unilateral effect concerns the merger’s impact on innovation; this also can 
take a couple of forms including “reduced incentive to continue with an 
existing product-development or reduced incentive to initiate development 
of new products.”65 
                                                                                                                           
 
59 Id. at 17. 
60 Id. at 18. 
61 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 41, at 18 n.9. 
62 Id. at 19. 
63 Id. However, market concentration is evaluated with reference to the relationship between a 
firm’s pricing of goods and its market share: if a firm increases prices, relative to its competitors, and it 
retains its market share, then “that firm already faces limited competitive constraints, making it less 
likely that its remaining rivals will replace the competition lost if one of that firm’s important rivals is 
eliminated due to a merger.” Id. at 18. However, if there is a highly concentrated market and the market 
shares fluctuate “substantially over short periods of time in response to changes in competitive 
offerings” then the market is considered to be “very competitive.” Id. 
64 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 41, at 20. 
65 Id. at 23. 
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Coordinated effects are those effects which involve coordinated 
conduct between competitors which may occur as a result of a merger.66 
Coordinated effects can include explicitly negotiated or implied terms 
between competitors pertaining to how they will compete against one 
another.67 Government agencies “examine whether a merger is likely to . . . 
[encourage] substantially more coordinated interaction.”68 As the 
Guidelines point out, the DOJ may file suit to prevent mergers if there is a 
danger of substantial anti-competitive effects resulting from coordinated 
effects “even without specific evidence showing precisely how the 
coordination likely would take place.”69 Three criteria need to be met in 
order for the Agencies to challenge mergers: (1) significantly increased 
coordinated behavior resulting in a highly concentrated market; (2) market 
vulnerability to coordinated conduct; (3) the Agencies credibly believe that 
the merger would enhance market vulnerability.70 
Mergers may have positive impacts on efficiencies in that mergers may 
“enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may 
result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new 
products.”71 Examples of increased efficiency, the Guidelines say, include 
combined assets and new or improved products, even if there is no 
immediate or direct reflection in price.72 Ability to “conduct research or 
development more effectively” is also a factor to be considered, though it 
may have little to no impact on pricing in the short-term.73 
A brief application of these criteria to the Penguin-Random House 
merger will presumably shed some light on why the DOJ chose not to 
challenge the merger. 
                                                                                                                           
 
66 Id. at 24. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 25. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. Considering the Apple suit discussed above, in which the DOJ argued that the publishers 
colluded with Apple to raise prices, one should pay special attention to the Guidelines’ statement that 
“The Agencies presume that market conditions are conducive to coordinated interaction if firms 
representing a substantial share in the relevant market appear to have previously engaged in express 
collusion affecting the relevant market. . . .” Id. 
71 Id. at 29. 
72 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2010, supra note 41, at 29. 
73 Id. at 31. 
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IV. WHY THE PENGUIN-RANDOM HOUSE MERGER SEEMS LIKE A GOOD 
IDEA—AND WHY IT MAY BE A BAD ONE 
Recall the Horizontal Guidelines criteria discussed above: (1) market 
shares and market concentration; (2) unilateral effects; (3) coordinated 
effects; and (4) efficiencies. The chairman and chief executive of one of the 
Random House’s parent companies, Bertelsmann, said the merger “will 
enable investments worldwide in new digital publishing models, in new 
distribution paths, products and services and in the major growth 
markets.”74 Though we can hardly expect objectivity from a Random House 
executive, it is not implausible to assume that Penguin Random House will 
have a greater ability to increase efficiency—this does not seem 
controversial. So, let us assume arguendo that the companies are correct 
that as a larger entity they will be able to invest in research and 
development, combine assets, and make their operations overall leaner and 
more efficient. Let us also assume arguendo that we have no need to worry 
about coordinated effects (in particular price fixing), courtesy of the DOJ’s 
settlement with the New York publishers which prevents the publishers 
from having any say whatsoever, for two years, over retail pricing of 
e-books. That leaves us market shares, market concentration, and unilateral 
effects to concern ourselves with. 
Regarding market shares and market concentration, note that it is 
possible—likely even—that the DOJ did not concretely define the market, 
meaning that it probably did not conclusively determine whether paperback 
books, audio books, e-books, hardcover books, etc. all belonged to the same 
market.75 Also bear in mind that in 2012, Penguin’s U.S. overall market 
                                                                                                                           
 
74 Press Release, Penguin Group USA LLC, Penguin and Random House to Combine Creating 
the World’s Leading Trade Publisher; Penguin Random House, available at http://www.penguin.com/ 
static/pages/aboutus/pressrelease/penguin_random_house_102912.php. 
75 Note that Penguin and Random House, in presenting their views to the European authorities, 
urged the EU to consider various types of media to constitute a single market; and the EU actually 
decided not to definitively answer the question, but rather it proceeded under findings that, in regard to 
the various types of media, there would be no anticompetitive effects. Bertelsmann v. Penguin Random 
House, No. COMP/M.6789, EUR-Lex 32013M6789, at *25, *30 (Eur. Comm’n Apr. 5, 2013). 
If in standard publishing contracts, e-book rights are bundled with physical book rights, then the 
publishers’ market share in the two media should be coextensive. However, it is not at all clear that this 
is going to be a reliable presumption going forward. For example, authors may insist, going forward, on 
unbundling rights to e-books from rights to physical books in contractual negotiations; in which case, a 
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share was 10.45% and Random House’s was 17.28%.76 Using these 
numbers, the pre-merger HHI was 615.86.77 The post-merger HHI would be 
977.01.78 Recall that, under the DOJ’s classification, an HHI of under 1500 
signals an unconcentrated market; and the lower the HHI, the lower the 
Agencies’ competitive concerns. Because the HHI is well under 1500, the 
Agencies likely concluded that this merger was far from being a 
competitive concern, despite whatever misgivings it otherwise would have 
on account of the concurrent antitrust suit against Apple. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
publisher’s market share of physical and electronic books may vary substantially. More, there is the 
issue of substitutiality: are e-books substitutions for physical books or supplements? Programs such as 
Amazon’s MatchBook endeavor to entice customers to buy both physical and electronic books. See also 
infra note 96 on the non-substitutiality of electronic and physical books. This suggests that physical and 
electronic books ought to be considered to be separate markets. This would have the added benefit of 
increasing scrutiny on the e-book market, rather than having it swept under the rug by collapsing it into 
a broader “books” market. This situation is complex, and there is no indication that the DOJ has given 
the appropriate attention to these nuances. Note that even if e-books are considered to constitute a 
separate market, that market may currently be so small that its import is accordingly marginal. However, 
the market may continue to grow, making inattentiveness to this market shortsighted. 
And even if publishers’ rights to the two media are coextensive, all of the difficulties discussed in 
this note, pertaining specifically to e-books, suggest that the DOJ needs to give serious consideration to 
how it defines market going forward. Is this turbulence in the publishing industry, pertaining to e-books, 
more than a blip on the competitive effects analysis if e-books are considered separately from the 
physical book market? 
76 Tom Tivnan, Scholastic Cracks US Six, THE BOOKSELLER, May 25, 2012. Numbers are based 
on 19 weeks up to May 13, 2012. Mr. Tivnan sourced his statistics from Nielsen Bookscan. Market 
share for the top ten publishing groups in the United States are as follows: 
1. Random House: 17.28% 
2. Penguin USA: 10.45% 
3. HarperCollins: 8.25% 
4. Simon & Schuster: 7.13% 
5. Scholastic: 5.99% 
6. Hachette Book Group: 4.99% 
7. Macmillan: 4.66% 
8. John Wiley: 2.05% 
9. Harlequin Books: 1.50% 
10. National Book Network: .46% 
77 See infra Figure 1, which is based on the data in supra note 76. 
78 Again, see infra Figure 1, which is based on the data in supra note 76. 
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Figure 1 
Recall that unilateral effects are those effects on a market caused by a 
merged firm. A merged firm may have effects on a market, which are 
actually pro-competitive. We can imagine what such a gloss might look like 
in this case. In order for the New York publishers to deal with Amazon 
effectively, the publishers need to combine their resources. Recent history 
supports the idea that these publishers, with the leverage they currently 
have, are ill-equipped to handle Amazon. The publishing industry is sailing 
into uncharted waters largely because of e-books. The root cause of the 
Apple antitrust suit discussed above was the Big Six’s worries that 
Amazon’s way of doing business under the old wholesale model was 
putting pressure on the bottom lines of these companies—but none of the 
companies, alone, were powerful enough to force Amazon to agree to a 
different pricing model, which would be more favorable to the publishers. 
Thus, they colluded with Apple in order to raise prices. The implication 
here seems to be, then, that if these publishing houses are to thrive in this 
new era of publishing which—though not yet dominated by e-books—is 
significantly intertwined with the issue of revenue gained from e-books, 
then the publishers are going to need some way of gaining some bargaining 
power in order to deal effectively with Amazon; the “idea was that the 
Pre-merger HHI Post-merger HHI
 
Random House   17.282 + 
Penguin USA   10.452 + 
Harper Collins     8.252 + 
Simon & Schuster    7.132 + 
Scholastic      5.992 + 
Hachette      4.992 + 
Macmillan     4.662 + 
John Wiley     2.052 + 
Harlequin Books    1.502 + 
National Book Network     .462  
       615.8602 
 
Penguin Random House  27.732 + 
Harper Collins      8.252 + 
Simon & Schuster     7.132 + 
Scholastic       5.992 + 
Hachette       4.992 + 
Macmillan      4.662 + 
John Wiley      2.052 + 
Harlequin Books     1.502 + 
National Book Network      .462  
 
        977.0122 
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combined entity would be better positioned in the digital market to combat 
companies like Amazon, whose aggressive pricing was putting pressure on 
big publishers.”79 The conventional wisdom seems to be that Penguin 
Random House “represents the publishing world’s challenge to 
Amazon. . . .”80 
So, the conventional take on why the DOJ allowed the merger to go 
forward so easily is that the numbers suggested there were no competitive 
concerns, and the DOJ likely reasoned that the traditional publishing 
companies were in need of more leverage in order for the publishing 
industry to bargain more effectively with Amazon, thus giving the 
publishing industry a way to try to preserve itself. This conventional 
explanation is not as easy to swallow on second glance. As noted above, 
Penguin’s settlement agreement is applicable to Penguin Random House.81 
And part of what is required of Penguin is that it eliminates any agreements 
it made with e-book retailers which limited the retailers’ ability to set the 
prices.82 This restriction is binding for two years.83 According to an industry 
insider, “The Justice Department came in at a time when agency pricing 
was weakening Amazon’s hold and dispersing the e-book market . . . . By 
eliminating fixed prices for e-books, they have handed the advantage back 
to Amazon. Now everyone else is losing share.”84 One independent 
publisher had this to say about the merger: “Like a lot of people, I at first 
thought the merger was a good thing in the fight against Amazon. Finally, a 
company with enough clout to stand up to Amazon’s thuggishness . . . . 
Until a book industry insider pointed out to me . . . that Random House is 
going to tell Penguin to settle the case with the DOJ . . . . And it is good for 
                                                                                                                           
 
79 Leslie Kaufman, Justice Department Approves Random House-Penguin Merger, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 14, 2013, available at http://mediacoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/14/justice-department-
approves-random-house-penguin-merger/. 
80 David Wagner, Could the Penguin-Random House Merger Actually Help Amazon?, THE 
ATLANTIC WIRE (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.thewire.com/business/2013/02/penguin-random-house-
merger-amazon/62193/. 
81 See generally supra Part I. 
82 Apple, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128364, at *13. 
83 Id. at *16. 
84 Stone, supra note 3. 
2014] AMAZON, OR THE MODERN PROMETHEUS 137 
 
Vol. 33, No. 1 (2014) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2014.76 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
Amazon.”85 In other words, there seems to be some real doubt that this 
merger was in the best interests of competition. Because the Penguin-
Random House merger was granted clearance by the DOJ on condition that 
the Penguin antitrust settlement apply to the new entity, it appears that 
Amazon has gained the upper hand, which arguably gives Amazon further 
opportunity to entrench and enlarge its market share. 
This preceding discussion appears to vilify Amazon—it suggests that a 
big problem with this merger is that it will further entrench Amazon’s 
pricing power over e-books. But a closer examination of the quotes 
above—which are all negative toward Amazon—reveals that they are all 
coming from the perspective of industry insiders who bemoan Amazon’s 
effects not on consumers but on the publishing industry. A commentator 
likened the Penguin Random House merger to “a financial version of a 
couple having a baby to save a marriage . . . [because] [e]ver since Amazon 
began ripping apart the book business, the largest houses have been looking 
for a way to fight back . . . they [seem to] have chosen an old-fashioned 
strategy: Size.”86 This commentator questioned whether the merger might 
not in fact be bad for the economy, i.e., if the combined entity would 
innovate or, rather, abuse its leverage.87 He compared Penguin Random 
House to U.S. Steel, and recalled that, once it got large enough, U.S. Steel 
“hardly worried about competition; it had little need to innovate or compete 
on price . . . [and then] U.S. Steel all but collapsed [in the 1980s], and a 
chunk of the U.S. economy went down with it.”88 Recall the Apple antitrust 
suit in which the publishers, without admitting to wrongdoing, settled suit 
brought by the DOJ.89 The court found—in the trial against Apple—that the 
publishers had conspired to raise e-book prices. It’s easy for this fact to get 
lost in the fray with all of this talk of preserving industries. There has been 
remarkably little discussion about the impact on consumers. In finding 
                                                                                                                           
 
85 Dennis Johnson, The Real Story Behind the Penguin-Random House Merger, MOBY LIVES 
(Feb. 15, 2013), available at http://www.mhpbooks.com/the-real-story-behind-the-penguin-random-
house-merger/. 
86 Adam Davidson, How Dead Is the Book Business?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/magazine/penguin-random-house-merger.html?_r=0. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 See generally supra Part II. 
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Apple guilty of violating antitrust law, Judge Cote said that the agreements 
between the publishers, in which they colluded to raise prices, 
compelled the Publisher Defendants to move Amazon and other retailers to an 
agency model for the distribution of e-books, removed the ability of retailers to 
set the prices of their e-books and compete with each other on price . . . and 
allowed the Publisher Defendants to raise the prices for their e-books, which 
they promptly did on both New Releases and Bestsellers, as well as backlist 
titles.90 
For this, along with other reasons (such as the resultant decrease in the 
quantity of e-book titles sold by Publisher Defendants91), Judge Cote found 
ample reason to conclude that the defendants violated applicable antitrust 
laws.92 Judge Cote’s conclusion is fascinating because it illustrates that 
what from one perspective seems to be pro-competition can, from another 
perspective, be anti-competitive. To wit: Publisher Defendants no doubt 
considered their collusion to be pro-competitive in the sense that it would 
give them an upper hand in dealing with Amazon; but that same action 
raised prices and prevented retailers from setting the prices of their goods 
which stifled competition among retailers, and therefore was detrimental to 
consumers who would have to pay higher prices for goods. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE AGENCIES NEED TO PROVIDE GREATER 
TRANSPARENCY INTO THEIR DECISION-MAKING PROCESS TO CLEARLY 
EXPLAIN EXACTLY WHAT EFFECTS THEY PREDICT A MERGER WILL HAVE 
ON THE MARKET AND WHY 
Citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), Judge 
Cote reminded us that it is “essential to remember that the antitrust laws 
were enacted for the protection of competition, not competitors.”93 
Conceptually, it seems difficult to disentangle competitors from 
competition, since in competition, one competitor often gains at the expense 
of another; thus what is good for competition may also be good for certain 
competitors and not for others. 
                                                                                                                           
 
90 Apple, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96424, at *141–42. 
91 Id. at *142. 
92 Id. 
93 Apple, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96424, at *185 (internal quotations omitted). 
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The publishing business is in a period of transition now which has 
upended the status quo; Amazon has changed the game and, from the 
perspective of the Big Five, is devaluing e-books, and consequently cutting 
into publishers’ profits, possibly threatening the long-term viability of an 
entire industry. In Apple, Judge Cote chastised Apple by noting that even if 
Amazon had been engaging in commercially detrimental and monopolistic 
pricing, “Apple’s combination with the Publisher Defendants to deprive a 
monopolist of some of its market power is [not] pro-competitive and 
healthy for our economy, it is wrong.”94 Judge Cote’s point is poignantly 
summarized by the following: “Another company’s alleged violation of 
antitrust laws is not an excuse for engaging in your own violations of 
law.”95 
There are many ambiguous variables in the Penguin Random House 
merger; as a foundational matter, it is necessary to ask—who is really going 
to benefit from this merger? At first blush it appears that Penguin Random 
House wins because it will have increased bargaining power, owing to the 
sheer amount of titles it publishes—Amazon will have to deal if it wants to 
provide these titles to its customers. Otherwise, the customers will go 
elsewhere for these titles and Amazon loses. This scenario seems 
straightforward, and likely, enough. However, owing to the Penguin 
settlement, which is binding on Penguin Random House, it is not clear at all 
that Amazon is the loser in this arrangement. After all, the agency pricing 
model that the Publisher Defendants so desperately sought is now an 
unavailable option for the next two years—time during which Amazon will 
be able to further accustom consumers to paying $9.99 for popular books 
and to integrate even more consumers into its Kindle platform (which is of 
course Amazon’s end-game strategy—the goal is to get people entrenched 
in the platform so that they will only spend money at Amazon96). So from 
this perspective, Penguin Random House isn’t even a clear winner. 
                                                                                                                           
 
94 Id. at *183. 
95 Id. at *183–84. 
96 Jeff Bezos has been quoted as saying, 
We sell the [Kindle] hardware at our cost, so it is break-even on the 
hardware. We want to make money when people use our devices, not when 
people buy our devices. . . . What we find is that when people buy a Kindle 
they read four times as much as they did before they bought the Kindle. But 
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Moreover, as the Apple case has shown, publishers are interested not 
necessarily in innovating in order to compete with Amazon, but rather in 
increasing (or at least maintaining) their bottom line; they turned to each 
other and to Apple out of fear and powerlessness. Rather than innovate in 
order to incentivize consumers to shop at places other than Amazon and/or 
to pay more than Amazon’s price for the e-books, the publishing companies 
sought refuge in the less creative alternative: conspire together to withhold 
e-books from Amazon unless Amazon agreed to allow the companies to 
switch to a new model in order to jack up the prices. There seems to be no 
reason to think that Penguin Random House is going to do anything other 
than force Amazon to agree to an agency pricing model; and though this 
may increase the publishers’ revenue, it is not clear that consumers will 
benefit in any way, but instead will suffer by being required to pay higher 
prices for e-books—as the publishers have wanted all along. 
The twofold layer of ambiguity here—between (1) whether Amazon or 
Penguin Random House will benefit from the merger; and (2) whether 
giving the publishers the ability to increase their bargaining power with 
Amazon through sheer increased market share, rather than through other 
clearly beneficial and competitive means, e.g. innovation, is going to 
benefit consumers (or merely just competition)—suggests that the DOJ 
erred in not publicizing its competitive assessment. How can we be sure 
that the DOJ, in anticipating the increased bargaining power Penguin 
Random House will have with Amazon, missed the forest for the trees by 
neglecting to consider the short-term benefit to Amazon (which may 
                                                                                                                           
 
they don’t stop buying paper books. Kindle owners read four times as much, 
but they continue to buy both types of books. 
Kelly Clay, Amazon Confirms It Makes No Profit on Kindles, FORBES (Oct. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyclay/2012/10/12/amazon-confirms-it-makes-no-profit-on-kindles/; 
Tony Smith, Amazon’s Bezos Confirms Content Pays for Kindle, REGISTER (Oct. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/10/12/amazon_ceo_bezos_confirms_content_pays_for_kindle/. 
Mr. Smith notes that Kindle uses a proprietary format such that it does not work with e-books from 
other suppliers. (However, open-source software such as Calibre, available at http://calibre-ebook.com/, 
gives consumers the ability to convert between formats. This may be too advanced for the average e-
book consumer.) The chain of inferences here is: 1. Amazon prices its hardware low to attract buyers; 
2. Kindle owners are more likely to purchase content; 3. Kindle owners cannot easily purchase Kindle-
compatible electronic media from anyone other than Amazon. Because Amazon’s goal is to entice 
customers into its ecosystem (1); and Amazon discourages compatibility with media provided by other 
companies (3), we may infer that Amazon wants its customers, once integrated into its platform, to 
spend money at Amazon, not any other supplier. 
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translate to a long-term benefit for Amazon)? Or, if the conventional 
wisdom is correct, and Penguin Random House will be better poised to 
grapple with Amazon—is this necessarily to consumers’ benefit? Has the 
DOJ mistakenly believed that benefitting a certain competitor is the same as 
benefitting competition?  
As these questions illustrate, the DOJ’s quiet approval of mergers 
leaves too much to the imagination; greater transparency in the DOJ’s 
decision-making process would reveal the impacts the DOJ expects mergers 
to have on the relevant markets—as well as whether these expectations are 
grounded in the realities of the market. In three years, we may know the 
answer to these questions: either Amazon will have a more unshakeable 
hold over the e-book market (which, it is not at all clear is harmful to 
consumers); or Penguin Random House will exert its muscle against 
Amazon in order to raise prices (which will likely be detrimental to 
consumers). It’s even possible—albeit somewhat improbable if the prior 
actions of the publishing industry are any indication—that Penguin Random 
House will actually use its greater resources to spur innovation to compete 
honestly with Amazon. Time will tell. However, had the DOJ provided 
more information to the public concerning their rationale for approving this 
merger, we would have a lot less uncertainty in, at the very least, what the 
expected pro-competitive benefits of the merger are. 
